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Resumen:
En los últimos años, la Comisión Europea y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión 
Europea han puesto diversas medidas fiscales aplicadas a las cooperativas bajo 
sospecha de ser ayudas incompatibles con el mercado interno. La cuestión 
principal a responder es en qué casos el tratamiento fiscal especial de las coo-
perativas constituye ayuda prohibida por el Artículo 107(1) TFUE. Hay una clara 
contradicción entre el desarrollo de la promoción del modelo cooperativo por 
parte de la UE y la estricta aplicación del Artículo 107(1) TFUE a las cooperativas 
y su tratamiento fiscal. Una forma de conseguir seguridad jurídica en esta cues-
tión sería que la Comisión modificara su Comunicación relativa a la normativa 
de ayudas estatales y la fiscalidad directa de las empresas, reconociendo la 
posibilidad de que las medidas fiscales de las cooperativas que actúan en el 
mercado estén justificadas por la naturaleza o economía del sistema fiscal, bajo 
ciertas condiciones.
Palabras clave:
Cooperativas, Tratamiento fiscal, Ayudas de estado.
1 This paper was elaborated in the context of a thesis work for the Master Programme 
LLM International and European Law, at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit 
Brussel).
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Abstract:
In the recent years, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice 
have brought many tax measures applied to cooperatives under the threat to be 
declared aid incompatible with the internal market. The key question to be answered 
is in which cases special tax treatment of cooperatives constitutes prohibited State 
aid under Article 107(1) TFEU. There is a clear contradiction between the development 
of the promotion of the cooperative model by the EU and the strict application of 
Article 107(1) TFEU on cooperatives and their tax treatment. A way of bringing legal 
certainty on this issue would be that he Commission amended its Notice on State 
aid rules and direct business taxation, by recognizing that tax measures applied to 
cooperatives acting in the market may be justified by the nature or general scheme 
of the tax system, under certain conditions.
Key words:
Cooperatives, Tax treatment, State aid.
Laburpena:
Azken urteotan, Europako Batzordeak eta Europako Batasunako Justizia Auzite-
giak kooperatibei aplikatutako hainbat neurri fiskal auzitan jarri dituzte, barruko 
merkatuarekin bateraezinak direlakoan. Erantzun beharreko galdera nagusia da 
zein kasutan kooperatiben trataera fiskal bereziak Europako Batasunako Fun-
tzionamendu Tratatuako (EBFT) 107(1) artikuluak debekaturiko laguntza diren. 
Kontraesan nabarmena dago EBk eredu kooperatiboa sustatu eta kooperatibei 
eta beren trataera fiskalari EBFTko 107(1) artikulua modu hertsian aplikatzearen 
artean. Gai honetan segurtasun juridikoa lortzeko, Batzordeak Estatuko laguntzei 
eta enpresen fiskalitate zuzenari buruzko Komunikazioa aldatu zezakeen, merka-
tuan diharduten kooperatiben neurri fiskalak, sistema fiskalaren izaera edo ekono-
miagatik justifikatutzat joz, egoera jakin batzuetan. 
Hitz Gakoak:
Kooperatibak, Zerga Tratamendua, Estatu Laguntza.
Código JEL
JEL, E62, P13, H29
1. Introduction
According to the International Cooperative Alliance, a cooperative is 
“an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common 
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economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise”.2 There are different kinds of cooperatives 
and as long as they compete in the market with other actors they are considered 
undertakings, particularly from the perspective of Article 107(1) TFEU. 
However, all cooperatives have in common that they act in the interest of their 
members and that they contribute to the community they belong to.
Many EU Member States have introduced legislation on cooperatives, 
including tax legislation. Reasons for doing so are, among others: their lower 
capacity to compete on the market because of their inherent obligations 
and characteristics; avoidance of economic double taxation; promotion of 
the cooperative model, etc. In some countries, there is a legal recognition 
(sometimes at constitutional level) of the need to have adequate legislation 
adapted to cooperatives. However, tax schemes of cooperatives often include 
benefits for them. Thus, in recent years, the Commission has examined under 
the scope of the State aid control some tax measures affecting cooperatives, and 
the ECJ, in Paint Graphos, has given some light on the matter.
The following research questions have inspired this paper: do tax 
measures applying to cooperatives constitute State aid? Are cooperatives in a 
comparable legal and factual situation to that of profit-making companies? 
Are such tax measures a selective advantage? Are they justified by the nature 
or general scheme of the tax system? How can the European Commission, 
the ECJ and EU Member States improve legal certainty on this issue? 
The case of cooperatives which act exclusively with their members is less 
controversial than the case of cooperatives acting with non-members.
This paper does not discuss the illegitimate use of the legal form of 
cooperatives in order to get a beneficial tax treatment. This paper does not 
try to do a comparative analysis of cooperative law in different Member 
States. Finally, it does not aim at discussing the creation, by EU Member 
States and the EU, of a common legal framework for social economy 
enterprises, in which cooperatives are included. Although these perspectives 
of cooperative law are part of the answer to the discussion of cooperatives 
and State aid policy, this paper aims at searching for possible solutions within 
the EU State aid policy itself.
2. EU State aid policy
EU State aid policy, as part of EU competition policy, pursues the objective 
of a functioning internal market, where competition between undertakings is 
2 http://ica.coop/en/what-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-principles
Gezki 11.indd   105 30/10/14   10:00:02
106 MIKEL AZCOAGA IBARRA
Revista Vasca de Economía Social • ISSN: 1698-7446 
GEZKI, n.º 11, 2014, 103-142
not distorted. An EU State aid policy is necessary to avoid situations where 
Member States do not allow a level playing field for undertakings within 
their jurisdictions by granting aid to some undertakings and artificially giving 
them a competitive advantage. Aid granted by a State to some firms distorts 
the normal functioning of the market because it is detrimental to the most 
competitive firms, therefore decreasing overall European competitiveness.3
From a competition perspective, State aid can be seen as adequate to 
correct market failures in certain activities, when the markets themselves 
are unable to develop those activities. The competition model follows an 
effect-based approach, which takes into account economic analysis and 
the overall positive and negative effects of the aid. If the positive prevail, 
aid will be considered “good aid” and compatible with the internal market 
(Kleiner, 2011:4). The competition model only aims at preventing aid that 
significantly distorts competition, and not every State aid measure.
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC 
Treaty) established within its Article 92(1) the prohibition, with the wording 
that is still used, of aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition and 
affects trade between Member States.4 Moreover, pursuant to Article 92(2) 
EEC Treaty, some kinds of aid were considered to be compatible with the 
internal market, and pursuant to Article 92(3) EEC Treaty, other kinds of 
aid could be authorized by the Commission. The logic of the initial State aid 
control was to avoid trade disputes between Member States and collectively 
wasteful subsidy competition (Coppi, 2011:75).
EU State aid policy has moved from a basic prohibition to a wide set of 
rules and case-law, with a consequent increase in efficiency and difficultness. 
State aid control has evolved towards becoming a policy instrument that 
has been framed in the context of the Lisbon Strategy.5 The Commission’s 
State aid Action Plan of 2005 (SAAP) aimed at changing the direction of 
State aid policy towards a more efficient approach to the control of aid 
granted by Member States. The smart use of State aid is related, on the one 
hand, to using it to counteract market failures, which allows efficiency. On 
the other hand, it is recognized that objectives such as regional cohesion, 
sustainable development and cultural diversity can be subject to State aid 
without the existence of market failures, but are legitimate objectives as 
3 Commission Consultation document on State Aid Action Plan COM (2005) 107 final, par. 7.
4 “Except where otherwise provided for in this Treaty, any aid, granted by a Member State or granted 
by means of State resources, in any manner whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition 
by favouring certain enterprises or certain productions shall, to the extent to which it adversely affects trade 
between Member States, be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market.”
5 Commission Communication, Europe 2020, A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth COM(2010) 2020.
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they result in equity. In fact, State aid should only favour clearly defined 
objectives of common (European) interest.6 The Commission undertakes 
economic analysis to determine whether State aid exists or whether State aid 
is compatible with the TFEU. However, the balancing test is only applicable 
where compatibility guidelines provide for it or where a given State aid does 
not fall within the scope of existing compatibility guidelines.7
The SAAP resulted in the revision of legislative documents with both 
substantial and procedural aspects. While a wider range of exemptions to 
the State aid prohibition were recognized in the general block exemption 
Regulation, the enforcement of the State aid control has become stronger, 
with the enactment of Commission notices8 regarding procedural aspects 
of State aid.
More recently, the Commission issued a Communication on the EU 
State Aid Modernisation (SAM).9 In line with the Europe 2020 growth 
strategy, the Commission proposes to modernise State aid policy from the 
perspective of three interrelated areas: economic growth, prioritisation and 
procedure. The future guidelines and exemptions will focus on public aid 
that is efficient, aimed at common objectives and with a significant impact 
on the single market. However, no reference to objectives related to equity 
and redistribution of wealth are made in this Communication, which were 
mentioned in the SAAP.
2.1. Treaty rules
Article 107(1) TFEU establishes a general prohibition of State aid.10 State 
aid is a measure which is taken by some public body and which, by means 
6 Commission Consultation document on State Aid Action Plan COM (2005) 107 final, par. 10.
7 For a detailed explanation of when the economic assessment is applied, see Commission 
staff paper on Common Principles for an economic assessment of the compatibility of State aid 
under Article 87.3 [2009], par. 5-8.
8 Commission Notice on Simplified procedure for the treatment of certain types of State 
aid [2009] OJ C 136/3; Commission Notice on a Best Practices Code on the conduct of 
State aid control proceedings [2009] OJ C 136/13; Notice from the Commission: Towards an 
effective implementation of Commission decisions ordering Member States to recover unlawful 
and incompatible State aid OJ C 272/4; Commission notice on the enforcement of State aid 
law by national courts [2009] OJ C 85/1.
9 Commission Communication on EU State Aid Modernisation COM(2012) 209 final.
10 “Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.”
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of State resources, directly or indirectly gives a beneficiary undertaking an 
economic or financial advantage which it would not have had under normal 
circumstances, and which relieves the beneficiary undertaking of a burden 
to which its finances would otherwise normally be subject (Vesterdorf and 
Nielsen, 2008:11).
According to Article 107(1) TFEU, a measure needs to fulfil four 
cumulative criteria in order to qualify as State aid: (i) State resources have 
to be involved; (ii) it must give an advantage to undertakings; (iii) the 
advantage has to be selective; (iv) it has to effectively or potentially distort 
competition and affect (or threaten to affect) trade between Member States.
A first element of Article 107(1) is that aid has to be “granted by a Member 
State or through State resources”. It implies that there must be a consumption 
of public financial resources. The concept of donor includes all levels of 
public authorities. Public entities and institutions, public companies under 
State control, and private entities directly or indirectly controlled by the 
State are examples of donors.11
Beneficiaries of State aid are companies, or as Article 107(1) TFEU 
expresses, “undertakings or the production of certain goods”. The prohibition 
is logically applied to companies acting on the market, because it is the 
level playing field in the internal market what the competition rules try to 
ensure. Although the concept of company is undefined in the TFEU, the 
ECJ gave a definition in Klöckner.12 Like in the case of the donor, the legal 
nature of the beneficiary is irrelevant. The definition focuses on the fact 
that undertakings engage in an economic activity.13 According to the ECJ, 
an economic activity consists in offering goods and services on a market.14 
Where an entity carries out both economic and non-economic activities, it 
is only considered an undertaking with regard to the former.15
The distinguishing element of Article 107(1) TFEU is that a given 
measure must confer an advantage to the recipient in order to constitute 
aid. The Commission looks at many types of aid, for example: grants or 
interest rate rebates, loan guarantees, accelerated depreciation allowances, 
11 ECJ, Preussen-Elektra AG v Schhleswag AG, Case C-379/98.
12 “An undertaking is constituted by a single organization of personal, tangible and intangible 
elements, attached to an autonomous legal entity and pursuing a given long term economic aim.” 
(ECJ, Klöckner v High Authority, Joint Cases 17 and 20/61).
13 ECJ, Pavel Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, Joined Cases 
C-180/98 to C-184/98.
14 ECJ, Commission v Italy, Case 118/85, par. 7; ECJ, Commission v Italy, Case C-35/96, 
par. 36.
15 Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State 
aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest, 
OJ C 8/4, par. 9.
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capital injections, tax exemptions, the purchase of land at less than the 
market price, the selling of land at higher than market price, privileged 
access to infrastructure without paying a fee, the obtaining of risk capital 
from the State on favourable terms, etc.16
State aid is only relevant under Article 107(1) TFEU if aid is selective, 
meaning that it favours certain undertakings, not all of them. In principle, 
general measures that apply to all sectors of the economy of a Member State 
and measures of general economic policy are not considered aid. However, if 
such measures that follow objective criteria and are granted to an indefinite 
number of beneficiaries have the ultimate effect of favouring certain 
undertakings or activities, they will be considered selective measures.17 Yet, 
differentiations between undertakings may justify that a general measure is 
only applied to undertakings in the same situation and not to others.18 The 
distinction between general measures of economic policy and State aid is 
often difficult.
Finally, Article 107(1) TFEU requires that State aid distorts or 
threatens to distort competition, and that it affects (or might affect) trade 
between Member States. The ECJ considers that when a financial aid 
strengthens the position of an undertaking in relation to other competing 
undertakings, it must be assumed that inter-state trade will be affected.19 
The Court looks at the position of the beneficiary before and after 
receiving the aid and determines whether its position is improved by the 
aid.20 This automatic assumption of a distortive effect on competition 
closes the possibility to counterbalance the wide application of selectivity. 
A narrower approach would perhaps be more adequate, where only 
undertakings that make use of their stronger position caused by State aid 
(for example by acquiring market shares previously held by a competitor) 
would distort or threaten to distort competition.
However, the SAAP 2005 is based, among other elements, in better 
targeted State aid and an economic approach to State aid policy. Therefore, 
the Commission will use, “when relevant”,21 economic analysis before 
considering that competition is likely to be distorted or that trade between 
Member States is likely to be affected. According to the balancing test, a 
16 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/vademecum_on_rules_
09_2008_en.pdf, page 6.
17 GC, CETM v Commission, Case T-55/99, par. 40.
18 ECJ, Laboratoires Boiron SA v Urssaf de Lyon, Case C-526/04, par. 36.
19 ECJ, Philip Morris v Commission, Case C-730/79, par. 11.
20 ECJ, Italy v Commission, Case C-173/73, par. 17.
21 Commission Consultation document on State Aid Action Plan COM (2005) 107 final, 
par. 21.
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measure should only be declared incompatible with the internal market 
when its negative effects on competition and trade outweigh its positive 
effects.
Article 107(2) TFEU provides for cases of State aid that are de jure 
compatible with the internal market. Such aid must nonetheless be 
notified to the Commission, and must be proportionate (Vesterdorf 
and Nielsen, 2008:27). Article 107(2)(a) TFEU refers to aid having a 
social character, granted to individual consumers. The aid cannot have 
the effect of discriminating products on the base of their origin. The 
second exception, Article 107(2)(b) TFEU, applies when a Member 
State grants aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or 
exceptional occurrences. The exception must be interpreted narrowly, 
which means that there must be a direct causality between the damage 
caused by the exceptional occurrence and the State aid.22 Lastly, pursuant 
to Article 107(2)(c) TFEU aid granted to the economy of certain areas 
of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany 
is also automatically compatible with the internal market, provided that 
aid is directed to situations directly created by the border inside Germany 
before its reunification.23
Article 107(3) TFEU includes exceptions that do not apply automatically, 
but the Commission may declare State aid falling under these exceptions 
compatible with the internal market. The Commission has a wide 
discretion in this respect.24 Article 107(3)(a) TFEU allows aid to promote 
the economic development of regions with an exceptionally low standard 
of living, high underemployment, and of insular regions referred to in 
Article 349 TFEU. Second, Article 107(3)(b) TFEU provides that aid 
to promote an important project of common European interest or to 
remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State may be 
compatible with the internal market.
Article 107(3)(c) TFEU allows “aid to facilitate the development of certain 
activities or of certain areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading 
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest”. Areas included here 
are regions in disadvantage if compared to other regions within a Member 
State, but different from regions that fall under letter (a) of Article 107(3) 
TFEU.25 Regarding aid to develop certain activities, aid must involve 
a whole sector of the economy and not only some undertakings acting 
22 ECJ, Giuseppe Atzeni and others v Regione autonoma della Sardegna, Joint Cases C-346/03 
and C-529/03, par. 79; ECJ, Greece v Commission, Case C-278/00, par. 81-82.
23 ECJ, Germany v Commission, Case C-301/96, par. 72.
24 GC, Regione autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, Case T-171/02, par. 94.
25 ECJ, Germany v Commission, Case C-248/84, par. 19.
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in that same sector. Because the development of the activity implies the 
strengthening of the position of some undertakings, different conditions must 
be ensured, depending on the case, in order to consider that operating aid is 
not granted,26 such as compensatory measures taken by the recipient of aid,27 
being aid linked to initial investment or job creation,28 limited in time, etc.
Aid to promote culture may be compatible under Article 107(3)(d), 
following its wording, “where such aid does not affect trading conditions and 
competition to an extent that is contrary to the common interest.”
Article 107(3)(e) TFEU gives the possibility to the Council to adopt 
decisions, on a proposal from the Commission, declaring compatible aid 
in cases different from the rest on Article 107(3) TFEU. The Council has 
exercised this possibility in the sectors of shipbuilding and coal.29
Article 108 TFEU contains the basic rules of the State aid control 
regarding notification and procedure. Under Article 108(1) TFEU, the 
Commission has the task of reviewing constantly aid systems existing 
in the Member States. Article 108(2) TFEU gives the Commission the 
competence to declare the incompatibility of State aid, or the misuse of 
such aid, and therefore decide that the Member State concerned must 
abolish or alter such aid within a certain period.
Under Article 108(3) TFEU, Member States have both the obligation 
to notify to the Commission their intention to grant or alter aid and not 
to implement it until the Commission takes a final decision. After being 
notified, the Commission shall either declare aid compatible with the 
internal market or initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2).
Article 109 TFEU allows the Council to issue regulations for the 
application of Article 107 and 108 TFEU, particularly to establish rules on 
procedure and declare certain categories of aid exempted from the obligation 
of the Member States to notify to the Commission. The Council adopted 
Procedural Regulation 659/1999, and the Enabling Regulation 994/98.
2.2. Secondary law
Council Regulation 659/1999 establishes rules on how Article 108 
TFEU is applied. There is a first distinction between existing aid (aid 
26 Operating aid is in principle not authorized by Article 107(3)(c) TFEU; ECJ, Siemens v 
Commission, Case C-278/95 P, par. 23.
27 ECJ, Belgium v Commission, Case C-75/97, par. 57.
28 Evans, A. 1997. EC Law of State Aid. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Page 176.
29 Council Decision of 10 December 2010 on State aid to facilitate the closure of 
uncompetitive coal mines [2010] OJ L 336/24.
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which existed prior to the entry into force of the Treaty in the respective 
Member States) and new aid (aid that is not existing aid, including 
alterations to existing aid).
The Commission does a preliminary examination of the notifications, 
after which it can decide: that the measure does not constitute aid, that 
there are no doubts about the compatibility of the aid with the internal 
market (a “decision not to raise objections”), or that it has doubts 
about its compatibility (a “decision to initiate the formal investigation 
procedure”). The formal investigation procedure can result in: a decision 
declaring that the notified measure does not constitute aid; a “positive 
decision” when the aid is compatible with the internal market; a “negative 
decision” when the Commission finds that the aid is not compatible with 
the internal market; or a “conditional decision” when a positive decision 
includes conditions subject to which aid may be considered compatible 
with the internal market.30 According to Article 14(1) of Regulation 
659/1999, when the Commission takes a negative decision it shall 
also decide that aid has to be recovered by the Member State from the 
beneficiary, unless it would go against a general principle of EU law, such 
as the principle of protecting legitimate expectations,31 or if recovery is 
absolutely impossible.32
The procedure regarding existing aid consists in a process of 
cooperation between the Commission and the Member State concerned, 
as there is no obligation to notify existing aid. If the Commission considers 
that an existing aid scheme is incompatible with the internal market, it can 
make proposals to the Member State to introduce changes or to abolish 
such aid scheme. It can result in a formal investigation procedure, if the 
Member State does not implement the proposed measures.
As a resort to the non-compliance of a Member State with a decision, 
the Commission itself or any other interested State may refer the matter 
to the ECJ directly, pursuant to Article 23 of Regulation 659/1999 and in 
line with Article 108(2)(2) TFEU.
Some kinds of horizontal State aid are exempted from the 
obligation of prior notification and Commission approval. The Council 
issued Regulation 994/98, known as the enabling regulation, which 
allows the Commission to declare compatible the following categories 
30 Regulation (EC) 659/1999 of Council of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for 
the application of Article 93 or the EC Treaty [1999] OJ L 83/1, Article 7.
31 The principle of legitimate expectations has been applied by the Commission only 
in cases where its own conduct had made businesses or Member States believe that certain 
measures were compatible State aid.
32 ECJ, Commission v France, Case C-214/07.
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of aid: small and medium-sized enterprises, research and development, 
environmental protection, employment and training, regional aid 
and de minimis aid. The Commission gathered the different areas of 
exempted aid into a general block exemption Regulation (currently 
Regulation 800/2008, which will remain applicable until 31 December 
2013).
The general block exemption Regulation (GBER) gives details on how 
and to which extent each of the mentioned categories is exempted. The 
GBER sets up various conditions that aid must meet in order to benefit 
from the exemption. It also limits the quantities that different types of aid 
can reach.
A new GBER to be applicable from 2014 onwards has been drafted 
and has passed its second consultation period. As part of the SAM, the 
new GBER introduces new provisions aiming at further simplification of 
the existing rules and extension of their scope, in order to promote the use 
of “good aid” by Member States.
When the Commission declares that a public measure does not 
constitute aid, that it is aid compatible or incompatible with the internal 
market, it does so by way of decisions, addressed to the Member State(s) 
concerned.
A decision from the Commission on State aid can be challenged 
through an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, by the State 
granting the aid, by other Member States, by the (intended) beneficiaries 
and by their competitors, satisfying the requirements of Article 263 
TFEU (Craig and De Búrca, 2011:1103). Because of the Commission’s 
discretionary power, the General Court (GC) and the ECJ can only check 
if the Commission has respected procedural and legal principles, if the 
facts are true, if the Commission has incurred in manifest error, or if it has 
misused its power.33
2.3. Soft law
In the area of State aid, the Commission adopts policy guidelines with 
different nomenclature and content, which explain how the Commission 
interprets and applies State aid legislation (Treaty provisions and secondary 
law), and which are binding on the Commission itself. The ECJ is not 
bound by these guidelines and therefore it can overrule them, if they 
33 GC, Regione Autonoma della Sardegna v Commission, Case T-171/02, par. 97; ECJ, Philip 
Morris v Commission, Case C-142/79, par. 11.
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depart from the provisions of the Treaty,34 obliging the Commission to 
modify them. However, the Commission has discretionary power to apply 
soft law, for example, when social or economic assessments are needed.35
Informal law texts aim at limiting the wide approach of the 
prohibition of State aid, while they reduce the margin of action of 
Member States in giving aid. In contrast, they are adopted without the 
consent of the Council, and therefore their legal status is below formal 
legislation.
Guidelines can be used by the Commission to explain when it considers 
that certain type of aid is compatible with the internal market. Unlike in 
the case of the general block exemption Regulation, the Commission adopts 
guidelines when the categories of aid concerned cannot be clearly defined in 
advance.36
One of the soft law texts on State aid and relevant for this paper is 
the Commission’s Notice on the application of State aid rules to measures 
relating to direct business taxation, which is analysed below.
3. Tax Notice
Member States are exclusively competent to decide on the configuration 
of their tax system, but they must exercise their prerogatives consistently 
with EU law.37 Therefore, Member States cannot introduce tax measures 
that are prohibited State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU.
In 1998, the Commission issued the Notice on the application 
of State aid rules to measures related to direct business taxation 
(Commission tax Notice) after the Council had adopted a resolution on 
a code of conduct for business taxation (code of conduct), which revised, 
in the context of harmful tax competition, many tax measures within 
the Member States. The Commission tax Notice gives examples of fiscal 
measures that can constitute State aid, develops each of the criterions, the 
possible justification and compatibilities regarding the qualification of 
tax measures as aid, and clarifies procedural requirements that Member 
States must meet.
34 ECJ, CIRFS v Commission, Case C-313/90, par. 34-36; GC, Regione autonoma della 
Sardegna v Commission, Case T-171/02, par. 29.
35 ECJ, Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission, Case C-730/79, par. 24.
36 Commission Consultation document on State Aid Action Plan COM (2005) 107 final, 
par. 36.
37 ECJ, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Schumacker Case C-279/93, par. 21.
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The requirement of State resources being involved is not controversial, 
and the tax Notice expressly says that “[a] loss of tax revenue is equivalent to 
consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure.”38
As explained before, the criterion of distorting competition and affecting 
trade between Member States is easily met. When a derogation from normal 
taxation exists, the fact that the aid strengthens the beneficiary’s position 
compared with that of competitors is automatically assumed.
In a non-exhaustive way, the Commission tax Notice lists the following 
types of tax measures as possibly providing an advantage: a reduction in 
the tax base (such as special deductions, special accelerated depreciation 
arrangements or the entering of reserves on the balance sheet); a total or 
partial reduction in the amount of tax (such as exemption or a tax credit); a 
deferment, cancellation or even a special rescheduling of tax debt. Other fiscal 
measures such as reductions on contributions to social security,39 disparities 
in the tax rate,40 non-taxation41 or the inactivity of tax authorities42 can be 
included in the list.
The concept of advantage in the Commission tax Notice is wide since 
it is identified with a reduction in the beneficiaries’ tax burden “which 
relieves them of charges that are normally borne from their budgets”.43 This 
presupposes that a derogation from a previous situation of normal taxation 
has been established by a tax measure.
In principle, general tax measures do not constitute State aid because 
they are part of the general tax system, while fiscal aids are exceptions to 
this system (Micheau, 2008:277). General measures are measures which 
are effectively open, on an equal access basis, to all economic agents 
operating within a Member State, and which do not de facto limit this 
38 Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to 
direct business taxation [1998] OJ C 384/3, par. 10.
39 ECJ, Belgium v Commission, Case C-75/97, par. 38.
40 In GIL Insurance, although an advantage was identified for operators to which a lower 
rate for insurance contracts was applied, the question on the justification by the nature and the 
general scheme of the tax system was answer positively (ECJ, GIL Insurance Ltd and Others v 
Commissioners of Customs & Excise, Case C-308/01, par. 78).
41 In Laboratoires Boiron SA, a tax on direct sales was charged on pharmaceutical 
laboratories and not to wholesale distributors. In this case, an additional proof of 
overcompensating effect on the wholesale entrusted with a public service obligation was needed 
(ECJ, v Union de recouvrement des cotisations de sécurité sociale et d’allocations familiales, Case 
C-526/04, par. 34-37).
42 Due to the lack of diligence of the tax authorities, for example, by not initiating tax 
collection procedures (ECJ, Commission v Hellenic Republic, Case C-415/03, par. 5).
43 ECJ, Portugal v Commission, Case C-88/03, par. 18.
Gezki 11.indd   115 30/10/14   10:00:03
116 MIKEL AZCOAGA IBARRA
Revista Vasca de Economía Social • ISSN: 1698-7446 
GEZKI, n.º 11, 2014, 103-142
access.44 The strict application of this definition would mean that all 
undertakings within a Member State should be taxed in the same way in 
all taxes and in all stages of taxation. 45 However, the comparability test 
and the justification by the nature or general scheme of the tax system 
allow some room for differentiation.
The Commission tax Notice mentions two types of general measures, 
as long as they apply to all undertakings and to the production of all goods: 
technical measures (for example, setting the rate of taxation, depreciation 
rules and rules on loss carry-overs; provisions to prevent double taxation or 
tax avoidance), and measures pursuing general economic policy objectives 
related to certain production costs (research and development (R&D), the 
environment, training, employment).
Fiscal technic is closely related to the Member States’ tax competences. 
It is the normal result of primary objectives and inherent principles of 
the tax system, so measures of fiscal technique are presumed to be general 
measures.
Measures pursuing general economic policy objectives related to 
production costs are, in principle, considered general measures and therefore 
do not qualify as State aid. Member States may use them to direct the 
behaviour of undertakings towards policy objectives, such as R&D, 
environmental policies, or labour-intensive industries (Prek and Lefèvre 
2012:335). However, the tax reduction must be linked to the production 
cost concerned, and tax measures are normally not suitable for this purpose, 
due to the lack of control of the requirements of an exemption once it is 
approved and because of the perdurable nature of tax measures. Therefore, 
tax measures are likely to be considered as compensating fixed or variable 
costs and thus being operating aid.46 In conclusion, if it is showed that a 
tax measure is aimed at indirectly favouring certain undertakings which 
are in fact the only ones incurring in such costs, the selective nature of the 
measure concerned will arise (Rossi-Maccanico 2009:71-72).
44 Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to 
direct business taxation [1998] OJ C 384/3, par. 13.
45 In some cases, the application of a measure to all undertakings that comply with 
objective conditions is not enough for the ECJ to consider it a general measure. In Spain v 
Commission, deductions of 25% on the gross corporate income tax payable granted to certain 
investments on export related activities were declared incompatible State aid. The only relevant 
arguments were that the measure could only benefit the category of undertakings carrying 
out exports and making such investments, and that it had effects on trade (ECJ, Spain v 
Commission, C-501/00, par. 120-125).
46 According to Rossi-Maccanico, “fiscal preferences are normally forbidden because it is 
difficult to estimate a link with investments and job creation, or to exclude that tax reductions are 
being used to reduce a beneficiary’s operating costs”. (Rossi-Maccanico 2007:93).
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3.1. The derogation test
A tax measure will normally consist in the establishment of a reduction or 
an increase in the tax burden of a concrete tax figure, which creates a change 
in a broader system of reference. This system of reference or benchmark must 
be identified. As the ECJ declared in Adria-Wien Pipeline, a tax measure 
is selective when, under a particular statutory scheme, it favours certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods compared to others, which 
are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the 
objective pursued by the measure in question.47 This means that the objective 
pursued by the tax measure concerned needs to be identified and, according 
to it, identify which are the undertakings in a comparable legal and factual 
situation.
There must be a causal relationship between the objective pursued in the 
concrete case and the differentiation in treatment. For example, in Adria-
Wien Pipeline, the ECJ reminded that the fact that a tax measure applies to a 
large number of undertakings or that those undertakings belong to different 
and big sectors are not reasons to consider it a general measure of economic 
policy. The Court held that the ecological considerations underlying the 
contested State measure did not justify it, because undertakings providing 
services and undertakings manufacturing goods damage the environment 
equally, but only the latter were included in the scope of the measure. It was 
derived from the Court’s reasoning that an objective of general economic 
policy, such as the protection of the environment, could justify a different 
tax treatment, if all relevant undertakings in a legal and factual situation fell 
under the scope of the measure.
The difficulty lies, however, in determining the scope of the said 
objective. In Netherlands v. Commission, the General Court interpreted that 
large industrial facilities should be considered sufficiently differentiated 
from the rest, so that a measure based on objective criteria that applied to 
all of them, and which was in accordance with the objective pursued by 
the measure (the protection of the environment), would not qualify as 
selective.48 The ECJ interpreted, on the contrary, that because restrictions on 
emission of nitrogen oxides applied to all undertakings in The Netherlands, 
there was a comparable legal and factual situation, and consequently the 
advantage of big facilities was selective. This shows the wide approach that 
the ECJ makes to comparability.
47 ECJ, Adria-Wein Pipeline, Case C-143/99, par. 41.
48 GC, Netherlands v Commission, Case T-233/04, par. 95.
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The result is that the ECJ has hardly ever concluded that undertakings 
are not in a comparable situation in the view of the objective of the measure 
at stake. Even if the ECJ has not classified the circumstances where this 
possibility may apply, it seems that it would admit it when the factual 
circumstances are “sufficient” to consider the measure not selective.49
The comparability test has some similarities with the principle of equal 
treatment, although they are different. They both mean that identical 
situations need to be treated in the same way, and situations that are 
different need to be treated differently. However, the comparability test 
directly relates an exception with a benefit, and a discriminatory treatment 
is presumed unless a justification on the nature or general scheme of the 
tax system is proofed. The principle of equal treatment is less strict, because 
it allows differential treatments as long as they are justified by reasonable 
objectiveness and proportionality in accordance with the objective pursued.
In addition, the tax Notice reminds that the ECJ declared in Italy v 
Commission that Article 107 TFEU (at the time Article 92 EEC) “does not 
distinguish between the measures of State intervention concerned by reference 
to their causes or aims but defines them in relation to their effects”.50 The 
effect-based approach has been used to overrule tax measures that pursue 
non-fiscal objectives, such as social, regional and environmental reasons. 
In British Aggregates v Commission, the ECJ held that Member States’ 
freedom on environmental policies does not go as far as to allow them to 
design tax measures that do not apply to all similar activities which have 
a comparable impact on the environment, because the effects of fiscal 
measures are relevant, not their objectives.51
Sometimes the various aspects that a tax measure introduces to the 
system can constitute a common or normal tax regime, so that the tax 
measure will itself constitute the reference framework. This does not 
automatically imply that such a tax measure is of a general nature. In 
cases where the technical design of a tax scheme gives it an autonomous 
character (e.g. environmental levies), rather than establishing a derogation 
from a general measure, the identification of the reference framework 
49 The ECJ held that “the substantial NOx emissions of the undertakings covered by the 
measure in question and the specific reduction standard applicable to those undertakings are not 
sufficient to enable that measure to avoid classification as a selective measure”. A quantitative 
criterion for establishing a differentiation, such as total installed thermal capacity of more than 
20 MWth, “cannot be regarded as inherent to a scheme intended to reduce industrial pollution 
and, therefore, justified only on environmental grounds.” (ECJ, Commission v Netherlands, Case 
C-279/08, par 76).
50 ECJ, Italy v Commission, Case C-173/73, par 13.
51 ECJ, British Aggregate Association v. European Commission s, Case C-487/06P, par 86-87.
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applying to all comparable undertakings may not be necessary, but then 
the measure must apply consistently with its objective.
In Government of Gibraltar v. Commission, the ECJ went further 
when it assumed that offshore companies and other companies were in a 
comparable situation looking at a hypothetical reference framework. The 
ECJ first reminded that the regulatory technique used by a tax measure is 
not relevant in the assessment of State interventions under Article 107(1) 
TFEU. 52 The Court also recalled that selectivity is not conditional 
upon having a general tax burden for two kinds of undertakings and a 
derogating measure applying to one of them. It rather held that a common 
or normal tax regime itself can constitute a selective advantage if it has 
the effect of creating a privileged category of undertakings. The ECJ held 
that because the new general tax regime applicable to all undertakings was 
based on the sole criteria of the number of employees and the size of the 
business premises, the effect was to eliminate the tax burden of offshore 
companies, because they have no employees and they do not occupy 
business property.53 The judgement has been criticised because the ECJ 
applied its view on what the tax policy and tax base should be, contrary to 
the view of the Gibraltar authorities, something for which Member States 
remain competent. According to the nature of the tax concerned (based on 
payrolls and property), the situation of offshore companies was different 
from that of companies that fell under the tax regime, and the only way to 
consider them comparable would have been to make substantial changes in 
the tax regime (Lang 2012:807-810).
3.2. Justification by the nature or general scheme of the tax system
It derives from the ECJ judgment in Italy v Commission that selective tax 
measures that are justified by the nature or general scheme of the tax system do 
not qualify as State aid.54 The Commission tax Notice defines these measures 
as the ones deriving “directly from the basic or guiding principles of the tax system 
in the Member State concerned”, or those which “economic rationale makes them 
necessary to the functioning and effectiveness of the tax system”.55 A selective fiscal 
52 ECJ, Commission & Kingdom of Spain v Government of Gibraltar & UK, Joined Cases 
106/09 P and C-107/09 P, par. 87-88.
53 ECJ, Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar, Joined Cases 106/09 P and 
C-107/09 P, par. 102.
54 ECJ, Italy v Commission, Case C-173/73, par. 15.
55 Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to 
direct business taxation [1998] OJ C 384/3, par. 16 and 23.
Gezki 11.indd   119 30/10/14   10:00:03
120 MIKEL AZCOAGA IBARRA
Revista Vasca de Economía Social • ISSN: 1698-7446 
GEZKI, n.º 11, 2014, 103-142
measure can be justified either by the nature of the whole tax system, or by 
the logic of the scheme which is part of. On the one hand, the inherent logic 
of the system is normally identified with measures that are a consequence of 
the basic or guiding principles of a tax system (progressive tax rates, measures 
to avoid double taxation and to combat tax avoidance,56 tax neutrality,57 etc.). 
On the other hand, tax measures that are an adaptation of the general system 
to meet particular characteristics of a certain sector will be justified by the 
logic of the scheme (Quigley 2012:114). However, in practice, most of the 
justifications accepted by the Commission have been based on the intrinsic 
features of the tax system, and only in a few cases did the Commission declare 
that a materially selective measure was justified by the general scheme of the 
system.58 It is for the Member State concerned to proof that a tax measure is 
justified by the nature or general scheme of the tax system.
The GC and the ECJ have applied the justification by the nature 
or general scheme of the tax system narrowly. Concerning selective tax 
measures justified by the nature of the overall tax system, both courts 
only consider measures that are a clear consequence of basic principles of 
a tax system as possibly justified. As the GC stated in Territorio Histórico 
de Álava v Commission, “the justification of the measures at issue ‘by the 
nature or overall structure of the system’ refers to the consistency of a specific tax 
measure with the internal logic of the tax system in general.”59 Concretely, the 
GC held that tax provisions which pursue general objectives of economic 
policy that are extraneous to the tax system concerned (such as encouraging 
investment) cannot justify a selective measure.
Regarding tax measures justified by the logic of the tax scheme of which 
they form part, only differentiations that are inherent to such a scheme are 
accepted by the Court. As seen in Netherlands v Commission, the ECJ held 
that a tax measure that distinguished undertakings on the basis of their 
thermal installation capacity was not justified by the nature of a tax scheme 
intended to reduce industrial pollution.60 In Belgium v Commission, the ECJ 
56 In GIL Insurance Ltd, a higher rate for some kind of insurance contracts counteracted 
the practice of avoiding the payment of VAT (GIL Insurance Ltd and Others v Commissioners of 
Customs & Excise, Case C-308/01, 2004, par. 74-78).
57 The Commission declared that the change on the legal form was neutral because it did 
not mean an increase in income or in the capacity to produce income (Commission Decision of 
5 June 2002 on State aid granted by Italy in the form of tax exemptions and subsidised loans to 
public utilities with a majority public capital holding [2002] C(2002) 2006, par 79-81).
58 Commission Report on the implementation of the Commission Notice on the application 
of the state aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation C(2004) 434, par. 35-36.
59 GC, Territorio Histórico de Álava and others v Commission, Case T-227 to 229, 265, 266 
and 270/01, par. 179.
60 ECJ, Commission v Netherlands, Case C- 279/08, par. 76-78.
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acknowledged that it should be determined whether reductions of social 
security contributions for workers of certain industrial sectors, aimed at 
promoting the creation of jobs, was in line with the nature or general scheme 
of the social protection system.61 The Court declared that the only effect of 
the measure was the granting of an economic advantage to the recipient 
undertakings, and could not therefore be justified by the nature or scheme of 
the social security system.
The Commission tax Notice distinguishes between external objectives 
assigned to a particular tax scheme (in particular, social or regional objectives) 
and objectives inherent to the tax system. Even if the Commission tax Notice 
does not expressly exclude non-fiscal objectives, it states that “[t]he whole 
purpose of the tax system is to collect revenue to finance State expenditure.”62 
Examples mentioned by the Commission tax Notice are the following: 
the progressive nature of the income tax, methods of calculation of asset 
depreciation and stock valuation, arrangements for the collection of fiscal 
debts, objective differences between taxpayers, exemption from profit 
taxation of non-profit undertakings, exemption on cooperatives that 
distribute all their profit to their members, taking into account taxes paid 
in the country where the undertaking is resident for tax purposes, taxation 
determined on a fixed basis, and specific provisions on the taxation of small 
and medium-sized enterprises.
3.3. Compatibility with the internal market and procedure
The Commission does not consider that State aid in the form of tax 
measures is different from other forms of aid, such as subsidies or loans. 
Therefore, the Commission has not issued Compatibility Guidelines for 
fiscal State aid, while recognizing that it did “not intend to devise specific 
compatibility criteria for State aid granted in the form of tax measures”.63 The 
Commission tax Notice indicates that a fiscal measure can be exempted 
from incompatibility with the internal market on the basis of either 
Article 107(2) or 107(3) TFEU. It also states that tax measures can qualify 
under Article 106 TFEU, which allows, under some conditions, to grant 
aid to undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general 
economic interest.
61 ECJ, Belgium v Commission, Case C-75/97, par. 33-34.
62 Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to 
direct business taxation [1998] OJ C 384/3, par. 26.
63 Commission Report on the implementation of the Commission Notice on the application 
of the state aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation C(2004) 434, par. 78.
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The Commission tax Notice acknowledges that tax measures hardly 
relate to specific projects and the precise volume of aid is difficult to 
calculate. However, fiscal aid which is in accordance with the objective and 
meets the conditions of one of the existing compatibility guidelines can be 
declared compatible with the internal market by the Commission.
The Commission tax Notice states that fiscal aid cannot be implemented 
before the Commission is notified pursuant to Article 108(3) TFEU and a 
positive decision declares it compatible with the internal market. However, 
a Member State can implement tax aid measures without the Commission’s 
approval if they fall under one of the categories of the general block 
exemption Regulation. In case of a negative decision, the amount to be 
recovered is calculated on the basis of a comparison between the tax actually 
paid and the amount which should have been paid if the generally applicable 
rule had been applied.
3.4. Tax measures and cooperatives
Regarding tax measures applying to cooperatives, the Commission 
tax Notice indicates that “it may also be justified by the nature of the tax 
system that cooperatives which distribute all their profits to their members 
are not taxed at the level of the cooperative when tax is levied at the level of 
their members”.64 This provision comes from the analysis by the Primarolo 
Group of many tax measures applied in Member States which could affect 
to a significant extent the location of businesses acting in the EU and 
therefore be qualified as harmful tax measures under the code of conduct.
The Primarolo Group analysed two French measures concerning 
cooperatives,65 and found that none of them were harmful tax measures. 
The first measure was a deduction of cooperative dividends, which 
applied to dividends distributed by consumer, producer and agricultural 
cooperatives. Dividends are the ones distributed to members pro rata 
from operations undertaken by the cooperative with each of them. The 
concerned tax provision indicated that cooperatives of which more than 
50% of their capital was held by non-cooperative members could not 
benefit from the deduction.
The second fiscal benefit for cooperatives was the exemption from 
corporate income tax for agricultural cooperatives, which complied with 
64 Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to 
direct business taxation [1998] OJ C 384/3, par 25.
65 Report from the Code of Conduct Group on business taxation on 23 November 1999 to 
the ECOFIN on the Code of Conduct on business taxation SN 4901/99. Pages 126 and 130.
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the relevant laws and provisions regarding their articles of association. 
In addition, agricultural cooperatives needed to have a majority of their 
capital held by its members, act solely with its members (activities with 
non-members would not be exempted) and distribute annual profits 
among members pro rata to the operations they had undertaken with the 
cooperative.
It appears that the Commission tax Notice was only influenced by the 
first of the mentioned fiscal benefits, recognizing the especial nature of 
cooperatives’ dividends (cooperative return), which are more heavily taxed 
as this income is included on members’ personal income tax. Thus, it can 
be assumed that Member States can decide not to tax cooperatives when 
they distribute all their profits to their members, with the certainty that 
the Commission will not review such measures.
It is questionable that paragraph 25 of the tax Notice requires that 
cooperatives distribute all their profits to their members, which means 
that cooperatives which remunerate capital investors which are not 
members are not under the scope of this provision. This requirement 
limits unnecessarily the number of cooperatives that could be certain that 
their tax benefits qualify for a justification. First, avoidance of economic 
double taxation of dividends is a widely accepted measure for all types of 
undertakings. Second, members of a cooperative are always remunerated 
pro rata to the activities they carry out with the cooperative, so the tax 
relief that the cooperative gets in this concept is always limited to the 
quantity of the returns given to their members. As there is no risk of 
overcompensation, the fact of having capital investors should not avoid 
cooperatives deducting the amount of tax paid by their members due to 
returns received. Paragraph 25 of the tax Notice, on the one hand, allows 
a full exemption of corporate income tax, and on the other hand, requires 
sole remuneration to members. This provision would increase its scope 
of application and would be more adapted to the reality of cooperatives 
if it allowed the exemption from corporate income tax of the income 
corresponding to cooperative returns distributed to members, with no 
other limitation.
The second type of tax incentives, which allow (agricultural) coopera-
tives66 not to be fiscally liable for corporate income tax in respect of the 
activities carried out with their members as long as they comply with 
certain constitutive requirements were not considered by the Commission 
tax Notice. The Commission did not investigate the possible State aid 
66 The fact that the concerned measure only applies to agricultural cooperatives is only 
circumstantial, as the French tax legislation exempted these kinds of cooperatives. Thus there is 
no reason why this argumentation should be only applicable to agricultural cooperatives.
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character of the measure. However, the Commission and the Court of 
Justice have reviewed some tax measures of this type and a settled answer 
has not been set yet.
4. Cases on cooperatives
Both international and European law have recognized the singular 
nature of cooperatives. The International Labour Organisation issued 
Recommendation 193 on the Promotion of Cooperatives, where it 
encourages States to improve the competitiveness of cooperatives and 
to adopt specific legislation on them. In addition, Council Regulation 
1435/2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society lists in its 
preamble the common guiding principles of cooperatives. The European 
Economic and Social Committee issued its Opinion on the diverse forms 
of enterprise, where it reminded that cooperatives do not relocate, so they 
continuously answer to the needs of the population, especially where social 
cohesion and the internal market can be jeopardised. This Opinion further 
claims that competition and tax rules should provide for the differential 
costs of enterprises to be regulated in a compensatory manner. The 
Commission issued the Communication on the promotion of cooperative 
societies in Europe, where it acknowledged that “specific tax treatment may 
be welcomed, but in all aspects of the regulation of co-operatives, the principle 
should be observed that any protection or benefits afforded to a particular type 
of entity should be proportionate to any legal constraints, social added value or 
limitations inherent in that form and should not lead to unfair competition.”67 
A common international and European legal framework for cooperatives is 
thus developing in different areas, such as competition law.
Despite the broad definition of undertaking used by the Commission, 
in which cooperatives are included, cooperatives have clear distinctive 
features that make them deserve having a special legal framework. The 
International Cooperative Alliance enounced some general principles68 
part of the cooperative identity, but which are not specific enough to 
form a cooperative legal identity. In European Member States, the legal 
framework of cooperatives in their company law and tax law aspects is as 
varied as the diversity of types of cooperatives.
67 Commission Communication on the promotion of co-operative societies in Europe 
COM (2004) 18 final, Page 13.
68 The ICA principles are: voluntary and open membership; democratic member control; 
member economic contribution and control of capital; autonomy and independence; education, 
training and information; cooperation among cooperatives; concern for community.
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Cooperatives are democratically run because members have one vote 
each irrespective of their contribution to the cooperative’s capital. The 
open character of cooperatives results in their capital variability, which 
means that the statutes of a cooperative do not need to be amended if 
new capital is subscribed or taken out. A cooperative is not a non-profit 
organization, thus it seeks to earn some profit from its economic activity, 
but at the same time a cooperative is run by its members and in their 
interest. The main objective of a cooperative may not be to contribute 
to the community, but their intrinsic nature, mainly their obligation to 
constitute mandatory indivisible reserves, necessarily raises their social 
function. Cooperatives are thus obliged to contribute with a substantial 
part of their benefits to the community.
The obligation of a cooperative to act in the interest of its members 
raises the questions of whether a cooperative can make transactions with 
third parties, and whether it can receive capital from third party investors. 
The answer to these questions depends on each national cooperative law. 
For instance, some national laws require that a percentage of the activities 
of cooperatives are done with their members in order to get a special tax 
treatment (Danish, Italian and Spanish laws), while others let cooperatives 
the option to foresee in their statutes the possibility to act with third 
parties, as long as these activities do not acquire more importance than 
the ones with members (Dutch and Norwegian laws). Some national 
cooperative laws allow them to have members who are only interested 
in the return on capital, while others require that all their members are 
users or workers (Fici 2012:57-58). In any case, remuneration of members 
for the capital subscribed is always limited. Regarding remuneration 
of members for transactions carried with them, a cooperative can only 
distribute returns pro rata to the number of these transactions. Due to the 
reasons given in the previous paragraph and in this one, it is logical that 
their contribution to the general budget, in the form of taxes, is lower than 
that of companies that, unlike cooperatives, do not internalize social costs.
The specificity of cooperatives in the ECJ case-law on competition law 
was recognized in Gottrup-Klim.69 A Danish agricultural cooperative with 
a dominant position prohibited its members to join other competitors, 
and these contractual clauses were alleged to be contrary to the current 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. However, the ECJ held that these agreements 
were not contrary to competition law. Neither did this cooperative abuse 
its dominant position in the market. The ECJ admitted that double 
69 ECJ, Gottrup-Klim e.a. Grovareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab AmbA, Case 
C-250/92.
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membership was contrary to the objective of the cooperatives concerned of 
acting for the benefit of their members. The Court held that a restriction 
to double membership could have procompetitive effects, and could be 
acceptable as long as they were limited to what was necessary to ensure the 
contractual power of cooperatives in relation to producers and effective 
competition, meaning that proportionality must be respected.
In addition to the two cases in which this chapter will focus, it is 
worth mentioning other cases where the State aid rules were applied to 
cooperatives. The ECJ judgment in Centre d’exportation du livre français70 
answered to a preliminary question by the French Conseil d’État by saying 
that the aid granted had to be recovered. Previously, three Commission 
decisions had declared the compatibility of the aid, and the three decisions 
had been annulled. In this case, the French ministry of culture subsidized 
a loss-making cooperative which exported books, in order to promote 
French culture. The possibility of considering this cooperative as a provider 
of service of general economic interest (the Altmark criteria) had been 
refused by the Commission.
Within the European Economic Area, the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
Decision of 23 July 2009 refused the possibility of Norwegian consumer, 
agricultural, fisheries, forestry and building cooperatives to qualify as 
providers of services of general economic interest under Article 59.2 EEA 
Agreement (correlative Article 106 TFEU). The EFTA Authority did not 
consider that safeguarding cooperatives was a public interest, because 
there had been no evidence showed by Norway about it.71 Norway had 
notified to the Surveillance Authority the proposed amendments to the 
Tax Act, concretely a tax scheme for the said cooperatives consisting in 
a tax deduction up to 15% of the annual net income, and made solely 
from the part of the income deriving from trade with the members of the 
cooperative.72 The selective nature of the deduction made the tax measure 
qualify as State aid within Article 61 EEA Agreement. The Norwegian 
authorities argued that the consumer, agricultural, fisheries, forestry 
70 ECJ, Centre d’exportation du livre français (CELF) and Ministre de la Culture et de la 
Communication v Société internationale de diffusion et d’édition (SIDE), Case C-1/09.
71 First, Norway should have showed that a clear entrustment of a public service was given 
by law to cooperatives. Second, the way in which the compensation was calculated should 
have been established beforehand. Third, proof of the compensation being only the necessary 
to cover the cost of the public service should have been given. Fourth, the link between the 
quantity of the cost and the choice of the entrusted undertaking would not have been a 
problem to make, because the objective requirement of being a cooperative sufficed.
72 EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision of 23 July 2009 on the notified scheme 
concerning tax benefits for certain cooperatives (Norway) [2009] OJ 158/39. Page 40.
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and building cooperatives needed the aid more than other cooperatives, 
without showing evidence of it. However, the reason to grant the aid 
was the limited access to equity capital of cooperatives, which all types of 
cooperatives suffer, thus the measure was selective.
The Surveillance Authority did not bear in mind the conceptual 
differentiation by which an entity that carries out both economic 
and non-economic activities is only considered an undertaking in 
relation to the former. Indeed, when it carries out activities with its 
members a cooperative acts outside the market. Therefore, a deduction 
on income coming from members cannot be considered to affect trade 
between States or to distort competition. However, the Surveillance 
Authority only admitted that pure mutual cooperatives were not in a 
legal and factual comparable situation to other undertakings, which 
was not the case of most of the cooperatives to which the deduction 
applied. Even if Norwegian cooperatives were obliged to keep separate 
accounting of transactions made with members and with non-members, 
the Surveillance authority required that cooperatives acted solely with 
their members in order to be capable of having such a tax deduction. 
This decision is highly questionable from the point of view of the ECJ 
case-law, because it penalizes cooperatives for their legal form, which 
should be irrelevant when analysing State measures in the light of the 
State aid policy.
4.1. Spanish case on agricultural cooperatives (Aid C 22/2001)
This case concerns a series of fiscal measures to support agriculture 
following the increase in fuel prices, adopted by the Spanish government, 
most of which were implemented before being notified to the Commission 
by letter of 29th September 2000. Among other changes, Royal Decree-
Law No 10/2000 of 6 October 2000 on emergency support for agriculture, 
fisheries and transport, amended Law No 27/1999 of 16 July 1999 on 
cooperatives and Law No 20/1990 of 19 December 1990 on the tax 
arrangements applying to cooperatives. It abolished the limit of 50% of 
turnover that agricultural cooperatives can have from activities with non-
member third parties in relation to deliveries of B diesel, without losing 
their preferential tax treatment. Moreover, it amended Law No 34/1998 
of 7 October 1998 on hydrocarbons, allowing agricultural cooperatives 
to deliver B diesel without the obligation to constitute a separate legal 
entity to which the general tax regime would be applied. Agricultural 
cooperatives in Spain had been first able to distribute petroleum products 
since Order of 31 July 1986 was enacted, but Law No 34/1998 had 
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introduced the prohibition for cooperatives to carry out such activities, 
unless they constituted a separate legal entity.
The Preamble of Law 20/1990 recognizes that the special tax regime 
of cooperatives on corporate income tax is composed by both technical 
adjustments and tax benefits. Spanish cooperatives are obliged to separate 
their income coming from members and from non-member third parties, 
so that the first are taxed at a lower rate, while the second are taxed at 
the general tax rate. Therefore, it is possible to identify which measures 
are technical adjustments to disadvantages caused by the attachment of a 
cooperative to its inherent principles. However, agricultural cooperatives are 
considered “especially protected cooperatives”, which benefit from a rebate 
of 50% of the tax payable, which is the sum of both the tax payable from 
activities carried out with members and third parties. Thus, this measure can 
be considered as a tax benefit aimed at promoting the cooperative model.
Commission decision of 11 December 2002 declared that the changes 
made only restored the legal situation and did not alter the tax regime 
of agricultural cooperatives regarding the selling of petroleum products 
previous to Law No 34/1998.
Moreover, the Commission acknowledged that tax advantages 
enjoyed by cooperatives were technical adjustment standards. Namely, 
cooperatives’ dividends (returns) are subject to double taxation, and 
members are allowed a lower deduction on their income tax than 
shareholders of a company.73 Cooperatives are also subject to mandatory 
reserves, which cannot be distributed even when the cooperative ends 
to exist. Finally, the Commission stated that tax regime of agricultural 
cooperatives must be analysed as a whole. Therefore, the measures 
regarding the distribution of fuel by cooperatives were considered not to 
constitute an advantage, so no State aid was involved.
On April 2003, two associations of service stations brought an 
action for annulment against the decision of 2002 before the GC. On 
12 December 2006, the Court issued a judgment in Case T-146/03, 
Asociación de Estaciones de Servicio de Madrid y Federación Catalana de 
Estaciones de Servicio v. Commission. The Commission defended its decision 
by giving arguments to support that the tax treatment of Spanish cooperatives 
does not confer them an advantage. First, the Commission stated that 
mandatory reserves of cooperatives are not equivalent to legal reserves of 
73 The Confederation of Spanish agricultural cooperatives argued that “the advantage that a 
cooperative might have enjoyed as a result of the company tax rebate is offset by the double taxation 
on personal income imposed on cooperative members and the increase in their tax burden in this 
way” (Commission Decision of 11 December 2002 on the measures implemented by Spain in 
the agricultural sector following the increase in fuel prices [2002] OJ L 111/24, par. 90).
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companies.74 Cooperative reserves are not in any case distributable. In 
addition, cooperatives must contribute to them with 25% of benefits from 
activities with members and with 50% of benefits from activities with non-
member third parties. According to the Commission, as cooperatives and 
capital-based companies are not in a comparable situation, the fundamental 
element of an advantage was missing, thus it was not possible to further 
question the existence of aid. The Commission thought, at the time, that 
tax regime of cooperatives constituted a complete one and not an exception 
from tax regime of companies, so this could not be considered the normal 
tax system from which a derogation must be identified.
The Commission stated that even in the case where an advantage for 
cooperatives was identified, it would be fully justified by the nature or 
general scheme of the tax system, which requires a different treatment for 
different realities. Here, the Commission recognized the principles of equal 
treatment, progressivity and ability to pay, enshrined in the Spanish tax 
system, as grounds for justification of cooperative tax benefits.
However, the GC annulled the decision due to the Commission’s lack 
of motivation in respect of advantages under the tax on capital transfers 
and documented legal acts, economic activities tax and immovable 
property tax. The judgment did not question the Commission’s 
argumentation regarding tax measures of cooperatives on corporate 
income tax. The GC also held that unless more detailed clarifications 
were given, the objective of liberalizing the sector of fuel distribution 
could not amount to a justification by the nature or general scheme of 
the Spanish tax system.
The Commission issued a new decision on 15 December 2009, with 
an opposite view in each of the criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU. The 
Decision goes beyond the General Court’s demand of motivation only in 
respect of taxes on transfer of property and documented acts, economic 
activities and immovable property. The Commission rather focuses on 
the corporate income tax of agricultural cooperatives and reconstructs its 
position.
Regarding corporate income tax of agricultural cooperatives, the 
Commission states that the advantage must be reviewed at a cooperative 
level and not at a member level. Therefore, it does not accept the argument 
by which the different tax treatment compensates double taxation of 
cooperative returns. This positioning is illogic, because the Commission 
itself recognizes in the Tax Notice that double taxation of cooperative 
74 Cooperative reserves increase the ability for creditors of the cooperative to get paid, as a 
way of compensating the variable character of a cooperative’s capital.
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returns needs to be taken into account, showing that a general view is 
necessary.
The Commission further argues that as the only relevant subject of the 
analysis is the cooperative, with their new situation, cooperatives would 
avoid the costs of creating a new company. On this basis, the Commission 
concludes that the requirement of an advantage is fulfilled. However, it does 
not take into account that, unlike the cooperative, this new company would 
not have an obligation to contribute with 50% of its results to reserve 
funds.75 The cooperative would avoid the costs of creating a company, but 
would suffer the fiscal costs that their non-cooperative income is subject to. 
If considered, this may have mitigated any possible advantage brought by 
Royal Decree-law 10/2000.
Then, the Commission concluded that only true mutual cooperatives 
(the ones that act only with their members) are not in a legal and 
factual situation comparable to capital-based companies, because these 
cooperatives do not obtain any benefit.76 It concluded that agricultural 
cooperatives and companies are in a comparable situation in respect of 
mandatory reserves, and therefore in respect of corporate income tax.
Finally, in the light of the exemption of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, the 
Commission discussed whether the said advantages of agricultural coopera-
tives were proportionate to the objective of promoting them and com-
pensate their inherent limitations. Here, the only inherent element of coopera-
tives used was the principle of mutuality. The direct consequence of this 
partial appreciation was that only measures affecting tax treatment of 
cooperative results could be proportionate to their special characteristics. As 
the measures analysed concerned extra-cooperative results, the Commission 
could not conclude that aid was given to eliminate inefficiencies in the 
market or to address other social or equitable objectives.
The Spanish Confederations of Cooperatives and of Social Economy 
brought an action for annulment on 6 April 2010 against this decision 
75 Extra cooperative results are subject to a high burden which results in low available 
benefits coming from these activities for cooperatives. This is because, first, a minimum of 
50% of the results from these activities must be destined to the Mandatory Reserve Fund; and 
second, the remaining benefit is taxed at the general tax rate of 30%. The higher the ratio of 
extra-cooperative to cooperative results, the larger the amount to be paid into the mandatory 
reserves, the higher the company tax and the smaller the percentage of available profit, so 
that the higher the extra-cooperative results, the lower the net amount received by each 
member. Thus, comparing the situation of extra-cooperative results and results of a company, 
cooperatives are in a disadvantageous position, due to the stricter commercial requirements they 
face. (Arana 2012:149).
76 Commission Decision of 15 December 2009 on the measures implemented by Spain in 
the agricultural sector following the increase in fuel prices OJ L 235/1, par. 163.
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which declares that the measures concerned constitute State aid incompatible 
with the internal market and orders recovery. The case is currently pending 
before the GC under the reference T-156/10.
Remarks
In its first decision, the Commission had concluded that no advantage 
was conferred to cooperatives on corporate income tax, because the beneficial 
provisions applying to them had to be considered together with their 
limitations, and within their whole fiscal regime. However, the GC did 
not decide on the substance of the case. There is a chance that the Court 
will annul this second decision, as it deviates from the previous judgment’s 
mandate to motivate on the justification of the measures in respect of other 
taxes different from corporate income tax. Even if the GC had agreed in 
most of the points of the first decision, the Commission changed its whole 
argumentation and changed its view on issues that were settled.
The Commission, in its second decision, disregards the legal, economic 
and social reality around cooperatives. The Commission’s first decision 
appears to be more logic than the second when it comes to the analysis 
of technical adjustments (purely fiscal measures) of cooperatives, because 
it considers the tax system of cooperatives as a whole, together with the 
treatment of returns received by their members, which are part of the 
cooperative itself.
In its second decision, the Commission only regarded the principle of 
mutuality as a relevant characteristic of cooperatives. However, national 
cooperative laws do not establish the relationship between the mutualistic 
character of cooperatives and tax incentives in absolute terms. As previously 
stated, some national laws limit to a certain percentage the activities of a 
cooperative with third parties. Other national laws require that activities 
with members are more important than the ones with non-members. In 
such national laws where specific limits exist for transactions with non-
members in relation to the ones with members, exceeding those limits 
will make the cooperative lose any tax benefit it was entitled to. Therefore, 
national laws establish mechanisms to control that tax benefits are granted 
to cooperatives that act in the interest of their members. The Commission 
introduces a narrower criterion when accepting tax benefits only for purely 
mutualistic cooperatives, which disregards the fact that cooperatives may 
need to act in the market in order to compensate their lower capacity to 
get funding, with the ultimate objective of acting in the interest of their 
members.
Other limitations such as the difficulty of cooperatives to get funding, 
their obligation to keep separate accounting and their obligation to allocate 
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a greater amount to reserves than companies should be as relevant as the 
mutual character of cooperatives. These limitations influence the ability to 
pay of cooperatives both as an actor towards its members and third parties.
However, the particular measure introduced by Spain to counteract 
the increase of fuel price followed an objective external to the tax system 
itself. In fact, the measure itself may constitute incompatible State aid, but 
the Commission went too far in assuming that the whole tax scheme of 
cooperatives could be qualified as State aid. Spanish authorities could have 
provided evidence of how the tax scheme of cooperatives complies with 
the constitutional mandate of establishing an adequate tax system and how 
tax benefits compensate in a proportionate way disadvantages inherent 
to them. In this case, it could have been reminded that keeping the legal 
form of a cooperative was not economically more beneficial because of 
the obligation to contribute with half of the extra-cooperative results to 
mandatory reserves.
It is difficult to proof that a given tax measure compensates a concrete 
disadvantage, because of the general character of fiscal measures. One 
possible way is that tax legislation is designed as to relating a tax relief with a 
limitation, such as measures to avoid economic double taxation of dividends. 
Tax legislation can also explain its compensatory nature in its preamble. 
Nevertheless, the Commission has used alternative methods in cases where 
it was impossible to calculate the costs of an investment or disadvantage.77 
Otherwise, it would be necessary to calculate in economic terms the 
beneficial effect that the tax preferences of cooperatives have as a whole, and 
compare it with the economic result of the legal limitations they suffer.
4.2. The preliminary ruling of the ECJ in Paint Graphos
The Court of Justice answered, on 8 September 2011, to the preliminary 
questions brought by the Italian Corte suprema di cassazione, in the context 
of three different proceedings (Joint cases C-78, 79, 80/08) regarding the 
77 For example, in the field of investment aid for environmental protection, the new draft 
GBER foresees that when the eligible costs of investing in environmental protection cannot 
be identified neither in the total investment cost as a separate investment nor by reference to a 
similar investment, the eligible costs will be the total investment costs themselves (Article 30(5) 
of the Draft GBER Proposal). This changes the current GBER which establishes the obligation 
to calculate the eligible costs by reference to a counterfactual situation (Article 18(5)-(8) of the 
current GBER). Even if aid granted to cooperatives is not among the exempted categories, this 
shows that the Commission can make exceptions to the strict application of the prohibition to 
grant operating aid, if it is willing to recognize the added value of certain activity.
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application of exemptions from various taxes to which producers’ and workers’ 
cooperatives were entitled under Italian tax law. According to Article 11 
of Decree of the President of the Republic 601/1973 (DPR), producers’ 
and workers’ cooperatives were exempted from tax on the income of local 
persons and local income tax if the total amount of remuneration actually 
paid to the members who worked for the cooperative on a continuous basis 
was not less than 60 per cent of the total amount of all the other costs, 
except from raw materials.78 This means that these cooperatives were not 
purely mutualistic, because they could have part of their activity coming 
from third parties and still apply the exemption under Article 11 DPR.
There was not much information provided about each of the cases. 
The first case involved the refusal from Italian tax authorities to the 
cooperative Paint Graphos of tax exemptions under Articles 11, 12 and 
14 of DPR. The second case was about the loss of fiscal benefits by the 
cooperative Adige Carni, because of invoices for non-existent transactions, 
which Adige Carni had not computed as income, so that the tax authorities 
assumed that it had distributed that amount to the members, in breach of 
Article 11 of DPR 601/1973. In the third case, Mr Franchetto, a member 
of a cooperative, was subject to an adjustment of his income tax returns, 
because he acted himself independently on the market and then the 
cooperative in whose name the purchase and sales invoices were made 
received a commission, finally distributing the surplus to its members, 
instead of appropriating it to the reserve fund.
Under Article 14 of the DPR, this exemption only applied to 
cooperatives governed by the principle of mutuality. A wide concept of 
mutuality is used under Italian cooperative law, because all the different 
obligations that cooperatives need to comply with are part of the objective 
of mutuality. According to Article 26 of Legislative Decree No 1577/1947, 
cooperatives were neither allowed to distribute dividends exceeding 
the statutory interest rate applicable to the capital actually paid, nor to 
distribute reserves to members during the life-time of the cooperative. 
In case of winding up, they were required to transfer all the assets, after 
deduction of the paid up capital and any dividends to socially committed 
associations. If any of these obligations was infringed, the cooperative 
would no more follow the objective of mutuality and would not anymore 
be entitled to tax exemptions.
The Italian court asked, in essence, whether tax benefits granted to 
cooperatives under DPR No 601/1973 constituted selective State aid. 
78 If the total remuneration was less than 60% of the costs but no less than 40%, the tax 
was reduced to half.
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The referring court also asked if the measures at stake could be regarded as 
proportionate in relation to the objectives assigned to cooperatives.
AG Jääskinen’s Opinion considered that the tax regime of cooperatives 
constituted an autonomous system. He argued first that the general system 
of taxation of legal persons is only applicable for cooperative societies 
for the purpose of regulating the relevant factors in determining the 
basis of assessment and the calculation of taxable income, but definitive 
taxation is subject to derogations applicable to all or to certain types of 
cooperatives. Second, a pure advantage can be equilibrated or justified by 
other obligations derived from the legal structure of a legal person, in which 
case it excludes an economic advantage. Tax advantages of producers’ and 
workers’ cooperatives had a transversal character and such cooperatives were 
not in a comparable situation in respect of other profit-making companies or 
the rest of cooperatives. Thus, Article 11 DPR 601/1973 was not selective. 
As one of the cumulative criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU was missing, it was 
not relevant to analyse the rest of the criteria.79
The ECJ started by clarifying that its decision should determine the 
common or ‘normal’ tax regime applicable, and see whether “any advantage 
granted by the tax measure at issue may be selective by demonstrating that 
the measure derogates from that common regime inasmuch as it differentiates 
between economic operators who, in light of the objective assigned to the tax 
system of the Member State concerned, are in a comparable factual and legal 
situation”.80 Here, the concepts of advantage and selectivity were treated as a 
single one.
Contrary to AG Jääskinen’s view, the ECJ held that the corporate tax 
was the legal system of reference, because “the basis of assessment of the 
producers’ and workers’ cooperative societies concerned is determined in the 
same way as that of other types of undertaking”.81 Perhaps the reason why 
the Court chose this benchmark is that the contested measures in Paint 
Graphos consisted, basically, in the exemption from corporate tax on 
benefits and local tax on income. Accordingly, the information provided 
by Italian authorities only related to that measure. However, no other tax 
measures or obligations inherent to Italian cooperatives were pointed out 
and thus complete and coherent information was missing about the tax 
regime of Italian cooperatives.
79 Opinion of AG Jääskinen of 8 July 2010 in Joint Cases 78/08 to 80/08, par. 73-78 and 
111-113.
80 ECJ, Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze e.a. v Paint Graphos e.a. Joint Cases 
C-78/08 to C-80/08, par. 49.
81 ECJ, Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze e.a. v Paint Graphos e.a. Joint Cases 
C-78/08 to C-80/08, par. 50.
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Then, the general characteristics inherent to cooperatives manifested in 
Regulation 1435/2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society and 
in Commission’s Communication on the promotion of co-operative societies in 
Europe, were pointed out by the ECJ. Among their operating principles: 
the primacy of the individual, the “one man, one vote” rule, the distribution 
of assets and reserves to another cooperative in case of winding-up, and the 
objective of mutual benefit of members. Among their disadvantages: none or 
limited access to equity markets, the limited interest on loan and share capital, 
with the subsequent lower advantage of investing on them.
In the light of their specific characteristics, the Court held that 
cooperatives such as the ones involved in the proceedings “cannot, in principle, 
be regarded as being in a comparable factual and legal situation to that of 
commercial companies,” provided that “they act in the economic interest of 
their members and their relations with members are not purely commercial but 
personal and individual.”82 Considering that the cooperatives within the 
proceedings acted to some extent with third parties, this statement could 
mean that the ECJ recognizes that predominantly mutualistic cooperatives 
are, together with purely mutualistic cooperatives, in a different comparable 
situation to that of profit-making companies.
However, the Court claimed that “the nature or general scheme of the tax 
system in question can provide no valid justification for a national measure if 
it provides that profits from trade with third parties who are not members of 
the cooperative are exempt from tax or that sums paid to such parties by way 
of remuneration may be deducted”.83 Strictly viewed, this would mean that 
the Italian measure would not be justified by the nature or general scheme 
of the tax system, because it allowed profits that came from third parties to 
be exempted. Nevertheless, a corporate tax system such the one of Spanish 
cooperatives would be justified, because it taxed income coming from third 
parties at a normal rate.
The ECJ held that the referring court should determine whether 
producers’ and workers’ cooperative societies are in practice in a comparable 
or different situation to that of profit-making companies, and if they 
are in a comparable situation, it would also be for the referring court to 
determine whether such an advantageous position forms an inherent part of 
the essential principles of the tax system, and whether it complies with the 
principles of consistency and proportionality.
82 ECJ, Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze e.a. v Paint Graphos e.a. Joint Cases 
C-78/08 to C-80/08, par. 61.
83 ECJ, Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze e.a. v Paint Graphos e.a. Joint Cases 
C-78/08 to C-80/08, par. 72.
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Remarks
The ECJ has taken a step forward in the progressive emergence of 
cooperative principles in competition law. In this way, the EU institutions 
may become more aware about the fact that cooperatives are not normal 
companies, but have specific characteristics and deserve special legislative 
treatment, in order to engage in equitable competition with capital-based 
companies (Parleani 2012:106-107).
Moreover, it can been said that in Paint Graphos, the ECJ, when 
referring to the national court to take the definitive outcome, might 
have followed the “rule of reason” approach, by which the measure taken 
by a Member State may be qualified as general if it pursues a legitimate 
objective (Prek and Lefèvre 2012:340). Indeed, in accordance with the 
SAM, this is the path that the Commission is trying to follow in State aid 
policy. However, in his Opinion, AG Jääskinen proposed to leave for the 
referring court to solve the matter because of the factual and legal elements 
in this case. Therefore, it is more likely that the “limited number of facts 
made available to the Court and the breadth of the issues to be addressed”84 
led the Court to issue a partial answer. In any case, there are consequences 
that can be steered from this judgement about the Court’s view on the tax 
regime of cooperatives from the State aid policy perspective.
It is noticeable that the Court, in its conclusion, refers to the task 
of deciding about comparability as a way of proving that a measure is 
justified by the nature or general tax system.85 This confirms the finding 
of a justification as the core stone of the assessment of tax measures in 
the context of Article 107(1) TFEU, while the concepts of advantage and 
selectivity become more relative. Even if the objective of a tax measure 
might be exceptionally admitted as a relevant justification, it must be 
an objective which is inherent to the tax system and complies with the 
principle of proportionality, which is also a requirement for justifying 
a State aid. Besides, it is essential to proof that the costs for a Member 
State of tax advantages, such as the ones benefiting Italian cooperatives, 
compensate disadvantages caused by obligations inherent to a specific form 
of legal person. The burden of proof is upon the Member States, while the 
Commission and the ECJ have showed to have a more flexible view when 
full information has been provided.
Then, should the national court simply conclude that no State aid exists 
if it decides that the situation between undertakings compared is identified 
84 Opinion of AG Jääskinen of 8 July 2010 in Joint Cases 78/08 to 80/08, par. 39.
85 ECJ, Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze e.a. v Paint Graphos e.a. Joint Cases 
C-78/08 to C-80/08, par. 81.
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as non-comparable? Looking at the relevance that the ECJ gives to objectives 
inherent to the tax system, it seems that determining that two situations are 
not comparable cannot stop the analysis under Article 107(1) TFEU.
Finally, Member States which have special tax schemes applying to 
cooperatives will need to design them in a way that compensates their 
structural disadvantages. A previous explanation in the national tax provision 
of how compensation is calculated would be desirable, as it is foreseen, for 
example in the Communication on Services of General Economic Interest.
5.  Proposal for an amendment of the Commission Tax Notice with 
respect to cooperatives
As it has been mentioned when analysing the Commission tax 
Notice, paragraph 25 can only be applicable to a very limited number of 
cooperatives. The exemption of income that is distributed as cooperative 
returns to members is logic because cooperatives can only remunerate 
their members pro rata to the activities they have undertaken with the 
cooperative. There is no need of limiting this possibility to cooperatives 
that do not have capital investors, because even for the ones having capital 
investors it can be ensured that the exemption from corporate income 
tax in respect of cooperative returns will only consist in the quantities 
distributed to members. Therefore, I would propose that paragraph 25 of 
the Commission tax Notice is amended in the following way:
“It may also be justified by the nature of the tax system that cooperatives 
are not taxed at the level of the cooperative for the quantities corresponding 
to distributed cooperative returns when tax is levied at the level of their 
members.”
Such an amendment of the tax Notice would bring a wider recognition 
of the special nature of the cooperative return, and would adequate to the 
economic reality of cooperatives, which are in need of external funding in 
order to keep their socially committed activities.
Moreover, regarding special tax treatment of cooperatives, it remains 
uncertain what the ECJ means by “basic or guiding principles of [the] tax 
system” and by “mechanisms inherent in the tax system”.86 The Court and the 
Commission in its tax Notice have admitted that the progressive nature of 
a tax rate and the non-taxation of purely mutualistic cooperatives for the 
86 ECJ, Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze e.a. v Paint Graphos e.a. Joint Cases C-78/08 
to C-80/08, par. 69.
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dividends distributed to their members constitute basic principles of the 
tax system. In Paint Graphos, the ECJ held that prevalently mutualistic 
cooperatives are in principle not in a comparable situation to other 
companies. More important is the fact that cooperatives that act to some 
extent with third parties, the social added value of which is recognized by 
some national laws, are in need of tax benefits in order to keep acting in the 
interest of their members. Therefore, it is not enough that the Commission 
tax Notice refers only to the principle of mutuality. It should also make 
reference to the other elements inherent to cooperatives already mentioned.
In this context, I would propose that the following sentence is introduced 
after the first sentence of paragraph 27 of the tax Notice, which gives 
examples of tax measures that may be justified by the nature and general 
scheme of the tax system:
“Moreover, tax measures which compensate cooperatives which act in 
accordance with certain principles (for example, democratic governance, 
prevalently mutualistic character) and obligations (for example, mandatory 
reserves, limited access to equity markets) inherent to them may be justified 
by the nature or general scheme of the tax system concerned, as long as they 
respect limitations to act with third parties provided by national cooperative 
laws.”
This recognition would not suppose an automatic exclusion of all tax 
regimes of cooperatives from their qualification as State aid. Such a tax 
measure (either a technical adjustment or a tax benefit) still should be 
in practice one deriving from the basic or guiding principles of the tax 
system, because Article 107(1) TFEU does not allow tax measures which 
overcompensate (not proportionate to the objective pursued) limitations 
inherent to a kind of undertaking. The proposed amendment would create 
a presumption upon which cooperatives, irrespective of whether they 
act only with their members or also to some extent with third operators, 
would be certain that an equilibrated tax scheme that compensates their 
extra-costs and their competitive disadvantages would be in accordance 
with EU State aid policy. The change in the Commission tax Notice would 
bind the Commission in its role of controlling the tax systems of Member 
States through the prohibition to grant State aid incompatible with the 
internal market.
The Commission has discretionary power to decide that a concrete 
measure is selective, overruling the possible justification given by the 
Member State. This discretion creates uncertainty among Member States 
about what tax policies they can follow. An amendment of the Commission 
tax Notice in this line would bring the necessary legal certainty.
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6. Conclusions
1) The application of the criteria in Article 107(1) TFEU to tax measures 
is currently not a settled question. As the criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU 
are cumulative, it appears that when it is concluded that two situations are 
non-comparable (therefore no advantage exists), no State aid is involved. 
However, the analysis would not end here, because comparable situations 
are viewed in the light of the objective pursued by the measure at stake, 
and only objectives inherent to the tax system are relevant. This last 
requirement is already part of the justification on the nature or general 
scheme of the tax system. Therefore, there must be a justification based 
on the nature or overall structure of the tax system to decide that two 
situations are not legally or factually comparable. The criterion of 
advantage and the justification based on principles inherent to the tax 
system are interrelated, and thus it cannot be decided that a tax measure is 
not selective before checking whether it arises from an objective inherent 
to the tax system.
2) Different Member States provide for special tax treatment of 
cooperatives. A lower tax burden is granted to cooperatives due to their 
exceptional contribution to the community. When applying Article 107(1) 
TFEU to tax measures of cooperatives, the main concern from a competition 
point of view is whether the measure limits itself to compensating a 
disadvantage caused by an obligation of the cooperative to contribute to 
the general interest. If such a measure does not overcompensate the costs 
of performing that obligation, it cannot be qualified as selective State aid. 
For example, on the one hand, the Spanish tax benefits on the calculation 
of taxable income coming from cooperative results are compensating 
measures, because it only affects income coming from members, outside 
any economic activity capable of distorting the internal market. On the 
other hand, the rebate that specially protected cooperatives get from their 
tax payable could be considered as overcompensating, because they get relief 
from income coming from both members and third parties. However, as 
not every tax measure specific of cooperatives can relate to a concrete cost 
or obligation, it is the task of the Member State concerned to show its tax 
scheme of cooperatives as a whole system separate from the general system 
of corporate income tax and which in overall compensates cooperatives for 
their limitations to act in the market.
3) The ECJ did not clarify what is understood by “basic or guiding 
principles of a tax system” and by “mechanisms inherent in the tax system”, in 
the context of tax measures applying to cooperatives. In Paint Graphos, the 
ECJ held that prevalently mutualistic cooperatives are not, in principle, 
in a comparable situation to profit-making companies. However, current 
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guiding principles accepted by the Court, such as the progressivity of the 
tax rate, are not enough to argue that tax measures of cooperatives are 
justified. In any case, Member States will have to design their tax scheme 
for cooperatives in a proportionate way.
4) The Commission should amend the tax Notice in order to adequate 
it to the economic and legal reality of cooperatives. First, it should widen 
the scope of the justification of the exemption from corporate income tax 
of cooperatives which relates to the avoidance of double economic taxation of 
cooperative returns, changing paragraph 25 in the following way:
“It may also be justified by the nature of the tax system that cooperatives 
are not taxed at the level of the cooperative for the quantities corresponding 
to distributed cooperative returns when tax is levied at the level of their 
members.”
Second, it should add one paragraph as to include tax measures 
compensating the disadvantages of prevalently mutualistic cooperatives as 
measures that may be justified by the nature or general scheme of the tax 
system. The same way it recognized the special character of cooperative 
returns, the tax Notice should view as positive proportionate tax measures 
that answer to other limitations inherent to cooperatives, besides mutuality. 
It is proposed that the following text is introduced:
“Moreover, tax measures which compensate cooperatives which act in 
accordance with certain principles (for example, democratic governance, 
prevalently mutualistic character) and obligations (for example, mandatory 
reserves, limited access to equity markets) inherent to them may be justified 
by the nature or general scheme of the tax system concerned as long as they 
respect limitations to act with third parties provided by national cooperative 
laws.”
5) Prevalently mutualistic cooperatives are the most common type 
of cooperative and their specificities have been recognized by EU legal 
instruments. Most of EU Member States that provide for the possibility 
of cooperatives to act with third parties limit this option to some extent 
(Gallego 2008:157). The ECJ made reference to these specificities in 
Paint Graphos, and the GC will soon have the opportunity to confirm the 
favourable position to cooperatives in Confederación de Cooperativas Agrarias 
de España y CEPES v Commission, where it is likely not only that it annuls 
the decision of the Commission, but also that it analyses the tax scheme 
of cooperatives as a whole, as more information was provided than in the 
Italian case. Although being unlikely, if only tax benefits for activities of 
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the cooperative with its members are admitted, Member States will have to 
adapt their systems towards exempting only this kind of income.
6) Cooperatives are in need of recognition of their tax treatment from 
the State aid policy. A balance should be made between the objectives 
of competition law on State aid and the promotion of the cooperative 
model within the EU, which consists in democratic governance, workers’ 
participation and social commitment of companies. The softening of the 
State aid prohibition regarding the special tax treatment of cooperatives 
would go in line with the SAM, as it mentions that effective public 
spending consists in using State aid only where it represents a real added-
value,87 to which cooperatives contribute. A less strict application of State 
aid policy in this issue would contribute to the objective of less and better 
targeted aid, together with sustainable economic growth, within the Lisbon 
2020 strategy. The SAM indicates that the Commission will revise its 
main acts and guidelines by the end of 2013. Thus, an amendment of the 
Commission’s tax Notice is possible, which would probably update it to the 
developing of the case-law of the ECJ and to the objectives of the SAM, 
and would hopefully recognize of the position of cooperatives from the EU 
State aid policy perspective.
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